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The Decline and Fall of IndyMac: How Deteriorating Economic
Conditions, Inadequate Responses to those Conditions, and the
Senior Senator from New York Caused One of the Largest Bank
Failures in United States History
I. INTRODUCTION
Bank failures are nothing new. From 1934 through 2007,
there were only two years in which no banks failed.1 During the
height of the savings and loan crisis of the 1990s, banks failed at a
rate of one every 1.38 days.2 The rate of failure slowed from 2000
to 2007, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
reporting thirty-two bank failures during that period.3 After two
years without a single bank failure (2005-2006), bank failures have
dramatically increased, with fourteen institutions entering FDIC
receivership between February 2007 and September 2008.4 The
largest of these, and the third largest in United States history at the
time, was the failure of California-based IndyMac Bank, FSB on
July 11, 2008.'
As early as the beginning of 2007, there were warning signs
S 6
about IndyMac's continued ability to survive. IndyMac officials
downplayed bad news while maintaining a business model focused
on growth and claiming that the bank's high level of capitalization
1. Jill Konieczko, The Ten Biggest U.S. Bank Failures, U.S. NEWS & WORLD




4. See FDIC: HSOB Failures and Assistance Transactions, http://www2.fdic.gov/
hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (input the relevant dates
for result).
5. Konieczko, supra note 1 (as a Federal Savings Bank, IndyMac was under the
supervision of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to its failure) (sources
render the bank's name as either "Indymac" or "IndyMac." I have chosen to use the
latter throughout this Note as that is how the name appears on official OTS and
FDIC materials.).
6. See Jim Cramer, Shorts' Dirty Dozen, REALMONEY.COM, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://www.thestreet.com/p/rmoney/jimcramerblog/10344308.html.
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would allow it to weather any storm. Aside from trimming some
jobs (cuts which were nearly cancelled out by the acquisition of
new lines of business), IndyMac did not take any decisive action
until it revamped its business model in January 2008, by which
time its stock price had fallen almost eighty-five percent (85%).8
Although the business model change temporarily buoyed
IndyMac, a major piece of that reform was reliance on the bank's
thrift branches, rather than mortgage origination.9 This reliance
was misplaced considering the financial difficulties faced by the
thrift segment.' ° By March 2008, IndyMac's stock price had sunk
to its previous low, and serious questions remained about the
bank's ability to remain solvent.1 These concerns were expressed
by Senator Charles Schumer in letters written to the FDIC, Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) of San Francisco.12 When these letters were made public,
IndyMac suffered a run on deposits with depositors withdrawing
$1.3 billion in less than three weeks. 3 Ultimately, IndyMac failed,
and the FDIC had to take over. This Note will examine the causes
of IndyMac's failure. It will demonstrate that deteriorating market
conditions, IndyMac's inadequate response to those conditions,
and the public concerns of Senator Schumer all had a role in the
failure.
Part II of this Note will look at the deteriorating market
conditions faced by IndyMac. It will show how those conditions
gave ample warning signals to IndyMac officials. It will also
demonstrate that while IndyMac officials can hardly be accused of
fiddling while the bank burned, the half measures taken to arrest
failure throughout 2007 were ineffective. Finally, it will
7. See, e.g., Grove Nichols, S&P and Moody's Downgrade Bonds Backed by
Subprime Mortgages, THE IMB REPORT, July 12, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/
index.php?paged=6.
8. See IMB INTERACTIVE CHART, http://finance.boston.com/boston?Page=CHA
RT&Ticker=IMB (providing a two-year chart of stock price).
9. See infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
11. See IMB INTERACTIVE CHART, supra note 8.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Damien Paletta & Paul Enrich, Crisis Deepens as Big Bank Fails-ndyMac
Seized in Biggest Bust in Two Decades, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2008, at Al(stating that
IndyMac had a little over $19 billion in total deposits as of Mar. 31, 2008).
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demonstrate that the new business model-with its reliance on a
troubled thrift business-unveiled in early 2008 was misguided and
did little to ensure IndyMac's solvency." Part III will examine the
Schumer letters and the accusations they caused the failure by
triggering a run on deposits. 5 Part IV will look at the aftermath of
the failure, including the FDIC's response and new allegations of
fraud being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). 6
II. ANATOMY OF A FAILURE
A. IndyMac and Subprime Spillover
At first glance, IndyMac was not a likely candidate for
collapse. Although the subprime lending market was in a freefall,
IndyMac specialized in making Alt-A loans. 7 These loans are
riskier than prime loans, but are less risky than subprime loans.'8
Traditionally Alt-A loans are extended to borrowers with good
credit, as most Alt-A loans require a credit score of at least 620;
however, most Alt-A borrowers do not provide full documentation
of assets and income. 9 These loans were very popular during the
recent housing boom, accounting for fifteen percent of mortgage
originations in the first half of 2007, compared with just two
percent in all of 2003.2o
Alt-A loans generally performed better than subprime
loans. After examining five years of data from 2002 to 2006, First
American Loan Performance found that the loss rate for subprime
loans was over ten times that of Alt-A loans.2' IndyMac's Alt-A
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. Press Release, OTS, OTS Closes IndyMac Bank and Transfers Operations to
FDIC (July 11, 2008) available at http://tradingsuccess.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/
2008/07/ots-closes-indymac-bank-and-transfers-operations-to-fdic.pdf.
18. See Sub-Prime Woes Start to Hit Less-Risky Lenders, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2007, at C4.
19. Alt-A, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,2007, at F06.
20. Id.
21. IndyMac Provides Additional Credit Loss Analysis on Alt-A and Subprime
Lending, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/
google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=newsview&newsld=20070329005839&newsLang=en
2009]
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loans performed even better than the industry average."
IndyMac's chairman and CEO described how Alt-A loans were
more similar to prime than subprime in a more colorful manner:
Alt-A is not "slightly" less risky than subprime, it is
a lot less risky .... I've also heard people say and
read it in the press . . . that Alt-A lending is 'in
between' prime and subprime lending... That's like
saying that our headquarters in Pasadena is 'in
between' Los Angeles and Las Vegas. True enough,
but there's the question of degree: Pasadena is
[eleven] miles northeast of Los Angeles and Las
Vegas is 262 miles northeast of Pasadena.23
As the subprime meltdown continued, however, the
problems in subprime loans began to "spill over" to what had been
24thought to be safer mortgages. In April 2007, lenders found they
were no longer able to sell Alt-A mortgages at enough of a
premium to cover the costs of origination. Instead, lenders were
26forced to sell the loans at par or lower. American Home
Mortgage, another Alt-A lender unaffiliated with IndyMac, was
hit particularly hard, and reduced its 2007 second quarter dividend
to $.70 per share from $1.12 per share in the first quarter.27 This
reduction was accompanied by an announcement that the
company had earned only about half as much per share as it had
expected, largely due to having to write-down many of its Alt-A
loans.28 This decline in the performance of Alt-A loans, which
surfaced first with American Home Mortgage, would soon affect
(stating that subprime loans had a loss rate of 55.9 basis points of unpaid principal
balance compared to 4.7 for Alt-A loans).
22. Id. (IndyMac's loss rate was only .81).
23. Id.
24. Vikas Bajaj, U.S. Subprime Problems Spill Over to Safer Mortgages, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Apr. 10, 2007, at 12.
25. See id.
26. Vikas Bajaj, Defaults Rise in Next Level of Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2007, at C1.
27. Bajaj, supra note 24.
28. See id.
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other Alt-A mortgages and was instrumental in bringing down
29IndyMac.
B. Initial Warning Signs
1. Short Selling
On March 14, 2007, about a month before the subprime
crisis began to spill over into the Alt-A market, financial analyst
Jim Cramer sounded the first warning for IndyMac, naming it as
the number one stock being sold short.3 ° Cramer wrote "I would
not own a single one of these [securities] myself .... The IndyMac
people are adamant they're not in trouble, but so were the
Accredited people," a reference to a company Cramer claimed
was struggling mightily." Cramer made specific reference to
"liquidity issues," 2 foreshadowing what would be listed as the
cause of death on the OTS's autopsy of IndyMac.33 Cramer and
the short sellers were proved right as the price of IndyMac fell
from a high of $36.66 on June 5, 2007, to $19.00 on August 15,
2007.3' Although the stock would rebound briefly, the overall
trend remained downward.35
Three months later, Thestreet.com, a financial news and
advice web site, claimed that while "the subprime meltdown is
already well under way, problems with Alt-A loans, or so-called
'liars' mortgages,' are only starting to rear their heads" and named
IndyMac as an institution in particular trouble.36 The article cited
29. See, e.g., infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text for declining earnings
data.
30. Cramer, supra note 6.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Closes IndyMac Bank
and Transfers Operations to FDIC (July 11, 2008), available at http://trading
success.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ots-closes-indymac-bank-and-transfers-
operations-to-fdic.pdf.
34. See IMB Interactive Chart, supra note 8 (showing month-by-month price
data).
35. See id. (providing a two-year historical price chart).
36. Nicholas Yulico, Two Ways to Play Mortgage Lenders, THESTREET.COM,
June 25, 2007, http://www. Thestreet.com /story /10364659/4/two-ways-to-play-mortga
ge-lenders.html.
2009]
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''severe pressure" on the Alt-A lenders caused by "lower gains on
sale margins."37 These lower gains would be potentially disastrous
for IndyMac, which had greater exposure to Alt-A loans than any
other lender." Financial analyst Robert Lacoursiere wrote that a
collapse of two leverage mortgage funds managed by Bear Stearns
was a harbinger of difficult times at IndyMac.39 He believed the
collapse of the funds indicated a decline in the Alt-A market, and
that such a decline that would hit IndyMac hard, considering its
large Alt-A exposure. 40 He believed that risk of Alt-A market
decline was not reflected in IndyMac's current stock price and
advocated selling IndyMac stock.4'
IndyMac dismissed the concerns by distinguishing itself
from Bear Stearns.42 Officials noted that the failed Bear Stearns
funds were comprised of very risky collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs).43  IndyMac, however, did not own any CDOs.44 The
IndyMac response also contrasted the loans made by the Bear
Stearns funds with those made by IndyMac: "Bear Stearns'
problem is with subprime securities, and subprime lending
accounted for only [four percent] of IndyMac's loan originations in
2006 and Q1 07. In the higher credit quality segment of the market
that IndyMac primarily participates in, conditions, though difficult,
are substantially better than in the subprime market.,
45
Not all analysts shared bearish concerns. Sahul Sharma,
writing in response to Lacoursiere, attempted to show that
IndyMac was not a stock investors needed to sell.46 He claimed
that IndyMac had learned its lesson during a liquidity crunch in
37. Id.
38. MIKE HUDSON, IndyMac: What Went Wrong? How an "Alt-A" Lender
Fueled It's Growth with Unsound and Abusive Mortgage Lending 6 (Ctr. For




42. See Grove Nichols, IndyMac's Response to The Street.corn, THE IMB REPORT,
June 27, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?paged=6.
43. Id.
44. Id. (capitalization in original).
45. Id.
46. See Sahul Sharma, IndyMac: Not Just Another Subprime Mortgage Lender,




1998, and because of that would be well-positioned to continue
operations through the current downturn.47 Sharma believed, that
if necessary, IndyMac would be able to sell Financial Freedom-
the nation's largest originator of reverse mortgages-for around
$800 million, a sizeable increase over its 2004 purchase price of
$112 million.48 Sharma also believed that IndyMac would not get
caught up in a spillover into Alt-A loans because not all Alt-A
loans were created equal.49 IndyMac's Alt-A loans tended to be
much less likely to default than those of competitors; the average
FICO score of an IndyMac borrower was 700,"o although
borrowers with credit scores as low as 620 were generally eligible
for Alt-A loan products.51 Sharma concluded that IndyMac was
undervalued, historically trading at 1.6 to two times book value,
but currently trading at only 1.3 times book value.
Sharma remained a lone voice in the crowd, however, and
by the end of June 2007, analysts from Keefe, Bruyette & Woods
(KBW) wrote that IndyMac was underperforming. 2 KBW looked
at "$58 billion of [IndyMac] private label securitizations," and
concluded that their previous earning per share (EPS) evaluation
had to be revised downward, and established a target price of
twenty-five dollars per share for IndyMac stock5 3 In making that
analysis, KBW looked at a rise in delinquencies and stated lower
EPS estimates were a result of lower gain on loans sold and "more
conservative expectations for the net interest margin. 5 4 IndyMac
pointed to several flaws in the study: (1) it looked at only one-third
of IndyMac's servicing portfolio; (2) IndyMac was exposed to
credit risk on a little over three percent of the holdings analyzed;
and (3) KBW neglected to look at most of IndyMac's earnings
base-the study examined only a portion of mortgage servicing,





51. See Alt-A, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, at F06.
52. Grove Nichols, IndyMac Response to KBW Equity Research, THE IMB
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mortgage production and its thrift business as well.55 While
IndyMac may have been justified in thinking these shortfalls left
"no way to assess the validity of [the] assumptions and analysis," it
was clear that by the end of the second quarter in 2007, the mood
on the street regarding IndyMac was pessimistic.56
2. Ratings Decline
Starting on June 28, 2007, there were concrete reasons to
be concerned about IndyMac" On that date, two classes of
Residential Asset Securitization Trust (RAST) bonds owned by
IndyMac were placed on Watch Negative by Fitch Ratings, one of
the three major credit rating agencies.58 The rating itself was not
significant to IndyMac; the company had bought the bonds for
revenue in 2004, and Kurt Johnson, IndyMac's Senior Vice
President of Retained Asset Management, wrote that the bonds
had performed better than had been expected. 9 The only real
significance of this downgrade is what it represented: From this
point on, IndyMac would enter a slow-but continuous-
downward spiral in terms of credit ratings, as will be described
below.6° This downgrading of IndyMac RASTs was, like the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the initial trivial event that
became a harbinger of cataclysm.
IndyMac's downward slide picked up momentum, in a
more dramatic fashion, a little over a week later.61 On August 7,
2007, the Standard and Poor's (S&P) credit rating agency placed
207 separate residential mortgage-backed securities "on
CreditWatch with negative implications., 62  All of the securities
55. Id,
56. Id.
57. See Kurt Johnson, Fitch Places 2 Classes on Watch Negative from IndyMac




60. See infra notes 61-69.
61. See Press Release, Standard and Poor's, Ratings on 207 U.S. Alt-A RMBS






were backed by Alt-A mortgages, which S&P claimed were facing
rising rates of delinquency.63 S&P also had the "expectation that
losses on the collateral will exceed historical precedent and may
exceed ... original expectations." 6 The reasons S&P gave for a
lack of confidence in Alt-A securities-high loan-to-value rations,
declining home prices, loose underwriting standards, and
speculative borrowing-were all concerns that had been expressed
about subprime loans earlier.6'
For IndyMac, this watch was much more significant than
the one issued a little over a week previously; in addition to
showing a lack of confidence in IndyMac's main product, this
watch hit the books more severely.66 Seventeen of the 207
downgraded bonds were issued by IndyMac, and, even more
significantly, the company still owned ten of them, with a book
value of $8.6 million.67  Notwithstanding the downgrade, there
were still reasons for optimism. 68 IndyMac Chairman and CEO
Mike Perry noted that the loans downgraded by S&P may not
have been typical of IndyMac Alt-A loans, which typically had a
lower loan-to-value ratio and performed as well as fully
documented jumbo loans. 6' As noted by Sahul Sharma above, the
average FICO score of an IndyMac Alt-A loan was 700, placing
most IndyMac loans in this more sustainable strain of Alt-A
loans.7 °
Despite the fact IndyMac loans may have looked better on
paper, the rating slide continued the following month.71  On
September 17, 2007, Moody's downgraded its issuer rating on




66. See Bond Portfolio Update, THE IMB REPORT, Aug. 7, 2007, http://theimbre
port.com/index.php?paged=5.
67. Id.
68. See Mike Perry, Email from Mike Perry, Chairman and CEO: Standard and
Poor's Press Release, THE IMB REPORT, Aug. 7, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.
php?paged=5.
69. See id.
70. See Sharma, supra note 40.
71. See Grove Nichols, IndyMac's Response to Moody's Downgrades, THE IMB
REPORT, Sept. 19, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?paged=4.
20091
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respectively." Although this was another cause for pessimism
about the overall health of IndyMac, there was little actual impact
on IndyMac. 7' The issuer ratings only mattered when a
corporation was seeking long-term debt financing, something
IndyMac was not interested in pursuing.
74
By this time, there had been a consistent downward trend
on IndyMac issues and the company itself, but IndyMac officials
remained optimistic. Although it had been hit hard in the third
quarter of 2007, Director of Corporate Communication Grove
Nichols expected that quarter to be the lowest point for IndyMac
and predicted "solid" profits in the immediate future.75 He also
stated that IndyMac's Alt-A losses were only one-fifth those of the
76industry average. Some ratings agencies even maintained
optimism. S&P wrote that not only had IndyMac "managed its
secured funding prudently to avoid margin or collateral calls from
its lenders," it could also call upon FHLB advances if it needed
quick access to unsecured liquidity.77
But even with this slight cause for optimism, the fears that
caused S&P to place the Alt-A loans on Credit Watch negative in
the first place were playing out. Moreover, delinquencies on
IndyMac's servicing portfolio continued to rise across the board.
The rate of delinquency increased over IndyMac's entire portfolio
from July-August 2007 was ten basis points (bps).7 8 The increase
for IndyMac subprime delinquencies (although a small part of
their overall portfolio) was 22.45 %.79 IndyMac claimed a 23.4 bps
loss on subprime loans in the second quarter.80 Delinquencies on





76. Grove Nichols, Update on Delinquencies in Our Mortgage Loan Servicing
Portfolios, THE IMB REPORT, Aug. 24, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?pag
ed=4.
77. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, IndyMac Bancorp Summary Analysis
(Aug. 16, 2007) (on file with author).
78. Grove Nichols, Update on Delinquencies in Our Mortgage Loan Servicing
Portfolios, THE IMB REPORT, Sept. 20, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?
paged=4.
79. Id.
80. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., Second Quarter Review 25 (2007).
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overall portfolio) rose at a rate of seven bps.8 For the first time,
IndyMac's delinquency rate rose above the industry average, a fact
directly attributable to its reliance on Alt-A loans. The ratings
game was also beginning to have an effect on IndyMac's bottom
line, with downgrades of IndyMac securities leading to increased
write downs." Although IndyMac's loans continued to perform
better than subprime, they were now performing markedly worse
than prime, and the spillover from subprime threatened to flood
out IndyMac with its Alt-A-heavy product mix.
On November 29, 2007, Moody's, the third of the major
credit rating agencies, downgraded IndyMac on three fronts:
"IndyMac Bank F.S.B.'s long-term deposit rating [dropped] to Bal
from Baa3 and its short-term deposit rating [fell] to not prime
from P-3. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc.'s issuer rating was downgraded
to Ba2 from Bal."8'4 Again, however, the signals were mixed.
IndyMac remained in a "strong liquidity position," having
increased liquidity from $4.1 billion to $6.3 billion as a result of a
forty-three percent increase in deposits. IndyMac remained well
over the capitalization levels required to be considered well-
capitalized by the OTS, and in remarks justifiable at the time, but
unfortunate in hindsight, Grove Nichols again claimed he was
"confident that [IndyMac had] the liquidity, capital and reserves to
weather the current storm in [the] industry."
8 6
By early 2008, the ratings slide was over. On January 23,
Moody's withdrew IndyMac's ratings. The ratings ended at
IndyMac's request, ostensibly to save money for a service which
was not needed since IndyMac "never relied on the corporate debt
markets for funding.", 8 While the company did admit that the
ratings were eliminated because the downgrades created a
81. Nichols, supra note 71.
82. Id.
83. IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., Third Quarter Review 5 (2007).
84. Grove Nichols, IndyMac Responds to Moody's Downgrades, THE IMB
REPORT, Nov. 29, 2007, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?paged=3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Grove Nichols, IndyMac's Request to Withdraw Ratings, THE IMB REPORT,
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perception of a credit risk, it denied there was any risk to IndyMac
in reality." In other words, despite the fact that IndyMac did not
need the ratings for any operative purpose, the steady stream of
pessimism was having an effect on the bottom line. IndyMac's
relationship with Moody's was only a year old at the time it asked
the agency to withdraw the ratings. ° Although the first part of
that year was uneventful, the latter part of the relationship was
tumultuous, with IndyMac being downgraded on four occasions
from June to November 2007."' The freefall would not end,
however, and IndyMac would collapse within six months.92
3. The Texas Ratio
That collapse was prognosticated by analyst Gerald Cassidy
of RBC markets over a month before it happened. Based on his
experience with failed banks in Texas and New England during the
financial crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, respectively, Cassidy
formulated the Texas ratio, which measures credit problems as a
percentage of the capital a lender has available to deal with them.
It is calculated by dividing a bank's non-performing loans,
including those ninety days delinquent, by the company's tangible
equity capital plus money set aside for future loan losses. Banks
with a ratio over one hundred percent tend to fail.93 In May 2008,
IndyMac's Texas ratio was 140%. 94 The article claimed the best
way to lower a high Texas ratio was to boost deposits by offering
highly competitive rates on certificates of deposit (CDs).9 In May
2008, IndyMac offered CD rates so attractive one commentator
called them "a bonanza ... [not] just edging competitors on yield
[but] trouncing them."96 Bankrate.com listed IndyMac as giving
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
92. See infra Part IV.
93. Alistair Barr, Bank Failures to Surge in Coming Years: IndyMac, Corus,





96. Tom Petruno, IndyMac CD Rates Surge as its Stock Price Plunges, L.A.
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the highest rate in the country on one-year CDs.9' A high Texas
ratio had been encountered by Countrywide the year before.98
Their response (high CD rates) had been the same.
Unfortunately, so would the end result.
IndyMac responded by calling into question some of
Cassidy's figures and claiming a Texas ratio between sixty-eight
and seventy-five percent.99 IndyMac officials also pointed out that
the bank did not offer high CD rates across the board, but merely
on one particular product as a promotional item.' ° IndyMac
claimed to be "well capitalized" with "strong total operating
liquidity."1 1 That capitalization and strength would be called into
question a little over a month later by Senator Charles Schumer
02
C. Inadequate Responses
Despite the pervasiveness of the warning signs, IndyMac's
response was largely ineffective. IndyMac spent much of 2007
alternatively expanding and cutting costs. On July 19, 2007,
IndyMac cut over 400 jobs, almost four percent of its total
workforce. °3 The cuts were spurred by a twelve percent decline in
dollar loan volume in the second quarter of 2007.10 The cuts were
expected to save over $30 million per year, and further personnel
cuts were expected on a smaller scale at a later date.
In addition to cutting costs, IndyMac announced that the
company was going to be "very hardnosed in redesigning . . .
processes in our drive to become the low cost provider in the
TIMES, July 10, 2008, at C4 (showing that IndyMac's six-month CD yielded 4.1%, the
next highest competitor's rate was 3.7%).
97. Barr, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. Grove Nichols, IndyMac Responds to MarketWatch Article on Expected Surge




102. See infra Part II.
103. Mike Perry, IndyMac Announces Right-Sizing of Workforce to Current
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mortgage industry." 1°6  That new process was fully unveiled a
month later. Stating that IndyMac could not "continue to fund $80
to $100 billion of loans through a $33 billion balance sheet ...
unless we know we can sell a significant portion of these loans into
the secondary market . . . and right now, other than the
[Government-Sponsored Entities] (GSEs) and Ginnie Mae... the
private secondary market is not functioning," CEO and chairman
Michael Perry introduced new underwriting guidelines.1 °7
Effective immediately, IndyMac began writing loans to facilitate
sales to the GSEs and GNMA, with a goal of selling sixty percent
of all loans originated. 0 8 Any unsold loans were to be held in
IndyMac's investment portfolio. 109
The new "hardnosed" process, however, did not prevent
the additional layoffs that had been anticipated; furthermore, the
new layoffs, contrary to expectations, were more extensive than
the original set. By the end of the third quarter 2007, IndyMac had
reduced its workforce by 1,547, approximately fifteen percent of
the pre-layoff workforce.11° Over 1,100 of those jobs were cut in
September, two months after IndyMac claimed that future layoffs
would not be as dramatic as the layoffs in July.1
There was a net increase in IndyMac employees during this
period, however, as the job cuts were more than offset by the
acquisition of new businesses. During the third quarter of 2007,
IndyMac hired 600 mortgage professionals released by American
Home Mortgage's own cost-cutting measures."' The bulk of the
new hires were involved in retail loan operations, expected to
"generate quarterly production of roughly $1 billion for"
106. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
107. Mike Perry, Email from Mike Perry, Chairman and CEO: Conditions in the
Private Secondary Markets and Their Implications for Our Industry and IndyMac,




110. Mike Perry, IndyMac Announces Results of Previously Announced Plans to
Right-Size Workforce to Current Conditions, THE IMB REPORT, Oct. 12, 2007, http://
theimbreport.com/index.php?paged=4.
111. Id.
112. Press Release, IndyMac Bancorp, IndyMac Expands its Retail lending Group




IndyMac.113 IndyMac also acquired the retail lending division of
New York Mortgage Company in the second quarter of 2007.114
This was not the end of IndyMac's expansion, as the
company made arrangements to acquire portions of Barrington
Capital in Newport Beach, California in August 2007.5 All told,
this round of expansion was expected to raise total loan
production by approximately $1.5 billion."6 The expansion was
part of the new business model with a focus on higher margin
retail business at the expense of "low margin, Alt-A conduit
business."l"7
The expansion did not work as planned. IndyMac's
earnings for the third quarter of 2007 showed just over $16 billion
in loans produced by the mortgage banking segment."' IndyMac
sold $13.8 billion worth of loans that quarter at a net loss of $157
million. 9 The numbers did not get any better in the fourth
quarter of 2007, after the new acquisitions had been integrated
into the company. IndyMac produced fewer loans, only $11.7
billion worth, and sold $16.5 billion in loans at a loss of $121
million."" The first quarter 2008 numbers were even more
disappointing: under $9.4 billion was produced, just over $10.1
billion was sold, and a loss of $134.9 million was suffered."' The
acquisition of the new businesses was unable to arrest IndyMac's
decline.
The new strategy also included rescinding a moratorium on
jumbo loans, which, at the time, were for amounts over $417,000,










120. IndyMac Bancorp, Annual Report (Form 8-K) at 12 (Feb. 12, 2008) available
at http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773468/000095013408002262/v37879e8vk.
htm.
121. IndyMac Bancorp, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 11(May 12, 2008)
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proved to be ineffective. On August 22, 2007, IndyMac reinstated
its jumbo product in several ARMs as well as in fifteen- and thirty-
year-fixed mortgages. The loans promptly sold-albeit for a
price "outside historical ranges ... [but still] an improvement over
several fire sale trades made by others in recent weeks.'
123
Although Communications Director Grove Nichols claimed the
sale supported the "decision last week to re-enter the prime jumbo
mortgage market," the wisdom of a fragile institution re-entering a
market where the gains are only over fire-sale prices is
124questionable. In fact, the anticipated thaw in the jumbo market
did not come until April 2008, when the federal government
permitted the GSEs to purchase jumbo loans of up to $625,000.
IndyMac's calculated gamble on re-entering the jumbo mortgage
did not pay off. By the time the GSEs agreed to buy the loans,
IndyMac had been forced to institute further cutbacks in the
workforce and was only three months away from collapse.
On January 15, 2008, IndyMac announced it was cutting
2,403 jobs-twenty-four percent of the total workforce. 
25
Chairman and CEO Mike Perry claimed that since the previous
round of layoffs "conditions have gotten worse in [the] industry.
The private secondary market remains virtually frozen.', 2 6 The
balance sheet was adversely affected by an increase in future credit
losses, with the credit reserve jumping seventy-one percent in the
fourth quarter of 2007, to a total of $2.4 billion. 12  The loan
pipeline suffered, falling twenty-eight percent in December 2007,
and the forecast for loan volume in 2008 was significantly lower
than the previous two years.28  The layoffs, which forced the
closure of five regional wholesale mortgage centers, were expected
122. Grove Nichols, IndyMac Provides Update on Recent Secondary Market




125. Mike Perry, IndyMac Announces Further Right-sizing of its Workforce, THE
IMB REPORT, Jan. 15, 2008, http://theimbreport.com/index.php?paged=3.
126. Id.
127. INDYMAC BANCORP, INC., FOURTH QUARTER REVIEW 8 (2008)
(http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/11/118924/2007-Q4-Earnings/NDE4Q
07EarningsPresentation.pdf).
128. Perry, supra note 118.
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to yield annual savings of $136 million. 9  Perry wrote that he
expected further layoffs of between 500 and 1,000 workers at some
point before July, and also made a blunt admission that the
previous business model was no longer viable: "IndyMac's
previous core business ...non-GSE mortgage banking ...is
currently gone" and the company had to initiate a business model
focused on conforming loans.13°
The new lending model Perry envisioned was based on
IndyMac's "structur[ing] its own mortgage securities and sell[ing]
directly" to GSEs."' He was also determined to maintain a jumbo
mortgage product, which he believed was "essential to being a full-
service mortgage banker, ' '112 regardless of the lack of a thaw in the
jumbo market since IndyMac had re-entered it. 33 The final prong
of the plan called for focusing on Indymac's thrift (or branch
banking) business by growing IndyMac's foundation of thirty
individual branches. Perry was optimistic this plan would allow
IndyMac to weather the financial storm and projected a total
profit of $13 million in 2008, following on fourth quarter 2007
losses of $509.1 million.
KBW analysts disagreed, calling IndyMac's credit
deterioration "stunning.', 36 The KBW analysts added IndyMac's
"'historic business model is broken and will continue to depress
earnings,' and that its new model as an originator of agency
mortgages will fail to build regulatory capital, which it needs
most."
137
IndyMac's own numbers also suggested the speciousness of
relying on the thrift business to weather the financial storm.
IndyMac's second quarter 2007 earnings press release noted that
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Harry Terris, IndyMac Chief Exec Outlines a Post-Recovery Road Map,
AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 14, 2008, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/art
icle.html?id=20080213DN52AC5A.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
134. Terris, supra note 131.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the thrift section "[p]erform[ed] poorly., 138 By the fourth quarter
of 2007, that poor performance had become even worse, with the
thrift segment reporting a net loss of over $186 million. 39 This loss
was across every section of the thrift segment, with the exception
of the Warehouse Lending Division, which had a net gain of
$18,000, for a return on equity (ROE) of two percent.
140
Performance did improve in the first quarter of 2008, with the
thrift segment responsible for a net loss of only $63.9 million.4
Whether Perry or KBW was correct about the long term viability
of focusing on the thrift business will never be known because the
new model did not have time to generate meaningful results. Only
two months later, the thrift branch deposits essential to IndyMac's
liquidity and Perry's plan suffered a run that resulted in the bank's
collapse. 142 The run was tied to the concerns of Senator Charles
Schumer.43
III. THE SCHUMER LETTERS
On June 26, 2008, Senator Charles Schumer'44 wrote letters
to Sheila Blair, Chairman of the FDIC; John Reich, Director of
the OTS; Ronald Rosenfeld, Chairman of the Federal Housing
Finance Board; and Dean Schultz, President and CEO of the
FHLB of San Francisco. The letters expressed worry over the
"safety and soundness" of IndyMac, citing concern "that
IndyMac's financial deterioration poses significant risks to both
taxpayers and borrowers, and that the regulatory community may
not be prepared to take measures that would prevent the collapse
of IndyMac or minimize the damage should such a failure
occur."'145 Schumer wrote that IndyMac's stock price had fallen
138. Press Release, IndyMac Bancorp, supra note 112, at 2.
139. IndyMac Bancorp, supra note 118, at 23.
140. Id. This can be contrasted with the mortgage-backed securities division,
which lost almost $124 million for a ROE of -169%.
141. IndyMac Bancorp, supra note 120, at 21.
142. See infra note 156.
143. See infra Part III.
144. Sen. Schumer was a member of the Senate Banking Committee and
Chairman of the subcommittee overseeing the Federal Reserve and economic policy.
145. Letter from Charles Schumer, United States Senator, to Ronald Rosenfeld,
Chairman, Fed. Housing Finance Bd., and Dean Schultz, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (June 26, 2008) (on file
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ninety-five percent over the past year, and that its new loan
production had dropped by two-thirds over the same period.
146
Schumer noted that IndyMac's portfolio had a delinquency rate
147twice as high as Countrywide. Schumer's greatest concern was
IndyMac's reliance on brokered deposits.4 8 He noted that such
deposits had accounted for sixty-four percent of deposit growth
since December 2006 and that they made up thirty-seven percent
of the total deposit amount.9  Schumer echoed Cassidy and his
Texas ratio-banks in trouble should attempt to raise deposits;
however Schumer believed brokered deposits, because they are
prone to sudden withdrawal, were not going to give IndyMac the
reserves necessary to survive. In his letters, Schumer directed four
questions to the FDIC and OTS:
[f]irst, has the FDIC verified that insured loans are
not supporting loans that do not meet the Joint
Banking Guidelines on ability to repay and
documentation? Second, has the FDIC considered
ordering IndyMac to reduce its reliance on brokered
deposits? Third, has there been any discussion
between the FDIC and the OTS about IndyMac's
increased reliance on brokered deposits? Fourth,
what steps has the OTS taken in response to
IndyMac's deteriorating loan performance? 5 °
The senator's letter included a prescient statement, "I am




148. Letter from Charles Schumer, United States Senator, to Sheila Bair,
Chairwoman, FDIC, and John M. Reich, Director, OTS (June 26, 2008) (on file with
author). Brokered Deposits are smaller deposits collected by a broker who will
aggregate them and buy jumbo certificates of deposit from the institution offering the
highest interest rate. These products are very rate-sensitive and brokers will
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redeem their deposits could leave the firm in a disastrous financial
situation.'' 5
IndyMac responded four days later with an implicit rebuke
to Schumer's presaging a bank run, stating it was important "we
all work together to keep institutions like IndyMac Bank safe and
sound" and that Schumer's letters "leave the wrong impression
with respect to three matters." '152 IndyMac wrote that the federal
regulators were aware of IndyMac's situation and all parties were
"working on a plan . . . to further improve the safety and
soundness of IndyMac."'' 3 The response then turned to the issue
of brokered deposits, claiming that they were not used to fuel
"rapid and.., irresponsible growth" as Schumer claimed, but were
instead used "to meet the higher margin requirements imposed by
the FHLB and to pay off completely all of [IndyMac's] market
funding sources," a move that many other banks made during the
credit collapse that occurred in the summer of 2007 . IndyMac
officials hoped to rely less on brokered deposits in the immediate
future and claimed that they presented no risk to IndyMac's
solvency, but instead improved "safety and soundness during this
turbulent period."'55
The response claimed that in the two days after Schmuer's
letters were made public, there had been a run on IndyMac
deposits, and $100 million had been withdrawn.56 IndyMac's
response laid the responsibility for the run squarely at Schumer's
feet: "as a result of Sen. Schumer making his letters public and the
resulting press coverage, we did experience elevated customer
inquiries and withdrawals in our branch network.'
5 7
IndyMac was not the only party to blame Schumer for the
bank run, which continued unabated even after IndyMac
responded to Schumer's concerns. Between the time Schumer's
comments were made public and IndyMac failed, more than $1.3
151. Id.
152. Grove Nichols, IndyMac Responds to Letters Sent by Senator Charles








billion was withdrawn in a little over two weeks.158 John Reich, the
Director of the OTS claimed Schumer gave IndyMac a "heart
attack" and blamed Schumer's comments for IndyMac's failure.159
Reich pointed out that before Schumer's letters were made public,
IndyMac's cash flow had been positive, and the bank was not even
on the FDIC's problem bank list.'6
Former IndyMac employees also blamed Schumer, urging
California Attorney General Jerry Brown to initiate a probe into
the Senator's actions."16 The employees claimed "[f]rom the day
[Schumer's] letter was made public on June 26 until the closure of
the bank, a run on the bank took place and the failure became
inevitable,16 2 and called Schumer's actions a "malicious, politically
motivated act. 16 3  Attorney General Brown declined to
investigate.96
Schumer, in turn, pointed the finger at the OTS: "If OTS
had done its job as regulator and not let IndyMac's poor and loose
lending practices continue, we wouldn't be where we are today...
• Instead of pointing false fingers of blame, OTS should start doing
its job to prevent future IndyMacs."'6' 5
The IndyMac employees may have been right in ascribing a
political motive to Schumer, however. According to the Wall
Street Journal, Oaktree Capital Management had been looking
over IndyMac's books prior to making a decision about investing
in the bank shortly before it failed. 6 Although Oaktree decided
not to invest, it continued to "scout[ for] assets that might become
158. Paletta & Enrich, supra note 13.
159. Id.
160. Joe Adler, FDIC Sees Big Premium Hike over IndyMac, AMERICAN BANKER,
July 15, 2008, http://www.financial-planning.com/asset/article/624891/fdic-sees-big-
premium-hike-over.html.
161. John Poirier, California Mulls Probing Senator Over IndyMac Crash,
REUTERS, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN2045763
020080820.
162. Id.
163. Tim Petruno, Brown Decides Against Probing Schumer on IndyMac, LA
TIMES BLOG, Aug. 22, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/moneysco/2008/8/califor
nia-atty.html.
164. Id.
165. Paletta & Enrich, supra note 13.
166. Susan Schmidt, U.S. News; Schumer Ripped IndyMac as Democratic Donors
Probed Books, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at A3.
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available if the bank failed."'67 Schumer denied any wrongdoing
and claimed to know nothing of Oaktree's interest before he wrote
his letters, but the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
received more than $700,000 in contributions from Oaktree in the
four years it was chaired by Schumer.168  Oaktree chairman
Howard Marks also denied any impropriety, claiming he only
knew Schumer socially and he never discussed business with him. 69
Regardless of the reason for Schumer's concerns, those
concerns led to depositors fleeing IndyMac. The bank desperately
tried to raise new capital and cut costs, going as far as eliminating
its mortgage program and eliminating half of its workforce7 The
company also attempted to attract new depositors and hold on to
current ones by offering very high rates on CDs.171 These actions
were to no avail, and in face of the $1.3 billion run, IndyMac was
forced into an FDIC conservatorship on July 11, 2008, just two
weeks after Schumer's letters went public.
172
IV. THE AFTERMATH
The FDIC initially estimated the failure would cost
between $4 and $8 billion."3 Despite the magnitude of the failure,
the FDIC had IndyMac up and running on the next business day
following the takeover. The FDIC's COO, John Bovenzi
claimed, "[f]rom an operational point of view of getting it up and
running, getting insured deposits ready, it was a very effective
process. 1 75 This was so despite the run on IndyMac assets which
continued even after the takeover-an event some commentators




170. Mike Perry, IndyMac Issues Stakeholder Letter, THE IMB REPORT, July 7,
2008, http://theimbreport.com/index.php.
171. Petruno, supra note 96 (IndyMac's annual rate on a 6-month CD, for
example, was 4.1%, compared to 3.7% for the next highest competitor).
172. See OTS, supra note 17.
173. Adler, supra note 160.
174. Joe Adler, FDIC Defends Handling of IndyMac Run, AMERICAN BANKER,





Others were less sanguine about the results of the takeover.
In the days following the takeover, worried customers seeking to
withdraw their deposits were allowed only limited access to
IndyMac branches."' While forced to wait in line (outside the
branches) to withdraw their money, an elderly woman fainted, and
other depositors were threatened with arrest, causing one
commentator to call the immediate aftermath to the takeover a
"three-day run of federal incompetence" and "a financial hostage
drama." '78 James Barth, an Auburn University finance professor,
was more measured in his criticism, blaming the lines and
continuing run on the "total lack of coordination and information
that [was] being provided to [depositors]."' 79  He believed the
FDIC did not adequately explain deposit insurance coverage,
fomenting unfounded fears in the minds of depositors."O Banking
consultant Bert Ely bluntly claimed the FDIC "botched" the
takeover, but he did concede the institution may have been caught
flat-footed by the sudden run after the Schumer letters."'
After stabilizing the situation with IndyMac depositors, the
FDIC turned its attention to underperforming IndyMac mortgage
loans. About a month after the takeover, the FDIC unveiled a
plan to "rehabilitate" distressed mortgages.182 The agency planned
to use reduced rates (capped at 6.5%), extended amortization, and
principal forbearance to achieve a thirty-eight percent debt-to-
income (DTI) ratio for borrowers who were seriously behind on
mortgage payments or already in default.83 The program proved
so successful that it is expected to be applied on a much larger
scale as part of the $700 billion rescue bill.'m
177. Peter Viles, The IndyMac Fiasco: A Three Day Run of Federal Incompetence,
LA TIMES BLOGS, June 16, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laland/2008/07/the-
indymac-fia.html.
178. Id.
179. Adler, supra note 160.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Press Release, FDIC, Loan Modification Program for Distressed IndyMac
Mortgage Loans (Aug. 20, 2008) (http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/modification/
indymac.html).
183. Id.
184. Joe Adler, Plan to Guarantee Modified Mortgages Makes Headway,
AMERICAN BANKER, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.americanbanker.com/printthis.html?id
=2008102924R6BH2K.
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In addition to the continuing run and allegations of
botching the takeover, there was one other irregularity of the
IndyMac failure: a federal investigation of fraud. Anonymous
sources reported to CNN that the FBI was looking into "whether
the bank engaged in fraud when it made home loans to high-risk
borrowers.', 15 While the FBI did not specifically confirm it was
investigating IndyMac, it did note that it was "investigating
twenty-one corporations in the subprime lending market for
possible mortgage fraud.' ' 186  CNN's source confirmed the
investigation was targeted at the company itself, not any
individuals.'87 At the time this Note was written, there had been
no further developments or public comments about the FBI's
investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the failure of an individual bank is nothing new,
there may be something distinctive about the questions raised by
the IndyMac failure. The most obvious question-is IndyMac only
the tip of the iceberg-seems to be well on its way to being
answered. The subsequent failure of Washington Mutual and near
death experience of Wachovia suggest that IndyMac was only the
first in line.
The FDIC's handling of the failure calls into question how
adequately the institution communicates with the public. The
whole idea behind deposit insurance is that it will prevent bank
runs by ensuring ordinary depositors will not lose any money.
That was clearly not the case after the failure of IndyMac.
Whether the continuation of the bank run after the FDIC stepped
in resulted from inadequate communication by the agency, poor
dissemination of information by the mass media, or ordinary
depositors' having a poor understanding of what FDIC insurance
meant, it is clear the mechanism is broken somewhere.






More troubling is the stability of the FDIC itself. The
institution's reserves stood at $45 billion at the end of June 2008,
before the failure of IndyMac. ' Although the FDIC claims to be
well positioned for additional bank failures, it announced in late
September 2008 that it would be seeking to increase the premium
it charges banks for deposit insurance 9  That increase is likely to
be substantial.'9 The FDIC expects to lose $40 billion by 2013,
almost totally wiping out the $40 billion reserve established before
IndyMac failed. (The IndyMac failure is expected to account for
almost $9 billion of the loss.)9 ' At the time this Note was written,
thirteen banks had failed, and 117 remained on the FDIC problem
bank list, leaving the agency with a ratio of reserves to insured
deposits of 1.01%-fourteen basis points below the statutory
minimum. 192  In order to re-establish the minimum required
reserves and put itself in a position to survive the next five years,
the agency is expected to double the average premium it charges
member banks. 93 It remains to be seen if this will be sufficient to
ensure the FDIC's solvency. While IndyMac's failure is expected
to cost the agency $9 billion, the bank had only $32 billion in
assets. On the other hand, Washington Mutual, whose failure
narrowly avoided falling onto the FDIC's tab, had $307 billion in
assets. 94 Even with a premium increase, it is questionable whether
the FDIC has the reserves to survive a catastrophic bank failure.
Perhaps the most important question is the one left
unanswered: how effective would IndyMac's new business model
have been in the long term? The obvious corollary to this is
inevitability of failure in the current market: are troubled financial
institutions able to take action to save themselves, or will they all
188. John Poirier, U.S.: FDIC Plans Significant Bank Premium Increase, REUTERS,
Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/etfNews/idUSN2338443920080923.
189. Id.
190. Steven Sloan, FDIC Eyes Doubling of Average Premium, AMERICAN
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080926ZNMBEAUT.
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head inexorably to failure absent a government bailout? The most
problematic aspect of the Schumer letters is not whether or not
they directly caused IndyMac's failure, but that they may have
robbed us of the chance to discover whether troubled financial
institutions can fight for survival, or if hiding money under the
mattress is again a viable savings plan.
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